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relieve the oppressed, 
judge the fatherless, 
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I. Introduction
This paper reviews how family law in the United States impacts upon fragile families in 
four ways. First, it discusses how fragile families are invisible to much of family law, and are 
largely ignored or neglected in family law. Second, it reviews family law reforms that have been 
intended to help or have had a beneficial effect upon fragile families. Third, it considers family 
law doctrines that appear to have had, and proposed doctrines that may be expected to have, 
detrimental impacts upon fragile families, either to cause or contribute to an increase in fragile 
families, or to exacerbate the plight of fragile families. Fourth, it suggests that strengthening the 
culture of marriage in society, and providing marriage-skills-training is one effective way to help 
fragile families. The paper will concludes with some general observations about the connections 
between family law and fragile families.
At the outset, it is important to define a few terms. First, by American Family Laws, I 
refer to the laws that are enacted to regulate family relations in the United States. Most of these 
laws are state laws, as the regulation of domestic relations is not one of the powers delegated to 
the national government in the Constitution, but remains one of the residual areas of sovereignty 
reserved under the Constitution (and particularly in the Tenth Amendment) to the States. Thus, 
the constitutional structural or power-allocation principle of federalism has influenced American 
family laws including those impacting upon fragile families, by mandating the de-centralization 
of the majority of family laws in the United States. That means that there is not one body of 
American family law, but at least 50 bodies of state family laws, which differ significantly from 
each other to a greater or lesser extent in detail, substance, and procedure. Thus, there is some 
inconsistency, variation and even direct conflict among the family laws of the fifty states.
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However, the federal government does have authority over large areas of human activity 
which incidentally (sometimes rather substantially) impacts upon and sometimes overrides or 
preempts the family laws of the states. For example, federal welfare laws and tax laws not 
infrequently influence and interact with state family laws. Also, some provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution or judicial doctrines based on the Constitution also influence and may even 
supercede state family laws. For instance, the constitutional doctrine of equal protection arising 
out of the Fourteenth Amendment has overturned or required modification of most gender role- 
based family laws. Thus, the constitutional delegation of specific powers to the national 
government and the principle of supremacy of the Constitution and the national laws enacted 
pursuant to specified powers provides some constitutional boundaries for the state regulation of 
family law and also provides some degree of uniformity of at least those areas of family law that 
are effected by areas of national regulation, most notably federal tax, welfare, and bankruptcy 
laws.
Ironically, there may be more federal law regulating “fragile families” than state law.
That is because “fragile families” are dealt with as a matter of poverty law, of welfare law, of 
public benefits law, and those areas of regulation are dominated by Congressional statutes and 
federal agency regulations and rules.
Second, the term “fragile families” refers to families that are particularly vulnerable for 
problems of poverty and other forms of social distress. The typical structure of “fragile families” 
is incomplete or broken, characterized by one-parent-childrearing (usually mother-headed 
families). Typically “fragile families” are “father-absent” families, which results in both 
absence of paternal income, but also absence of paternal influence and example. Often they are
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families where a father has never been present, because the child was born out of wedlock.2
Sara S. McLanahan has been a leading voice in calling attention to the plight of “fragile 
families.”3 A single mother herself, she has stated: “When I first [began researching this issue] I 
wanted to demonstrate that single mothers could do just as good a job of raising children as 
married moms. Unfortunately, the evidence led me to somewhat different conclusions.”4 Her 
terse summary of the consequences of divorce for children of is well-known: “Almost anything 
you can imagine not wanting to happen to your children is a consequence of divorce.”5 She has 
noted that: “Mother-only families are . . . subjected to numerous . . . forms of economic and 
social instability, such as income loss, residential moves, and changes in employment and
2See generally The Fragile Familes and Child Wellbeing Study, available at 
<http://crew.princeton.edu/fragilefamilies/collaborative.asp> (Viewed May 23, 2003).
3See generally Sara McLanahan & Gary D. Sandefur, Growing Up With A Single Parent: 
What Hurts, What Helps (1994); Irwin Garfinkel & Sara S. McLanahan, Single Mothers and 
Their Children, A New American Dilemma (1986); Sara S. McLanahan, Father Absence and the 
Welfare o f Children, in Coping With Divorce, Single Parenting, and Remarriage: A Risk and 
Resiliency Perspective 117 (1999); Sara McLanahan & Julien Teitler, The Consequences o f 
Father Absence, in Parenting and Child Development in "Nontraditional" Families 83 (Michael 
E. Lamb ed., 1999); Anne Case, I-Fen Lin, & Sara McLanahan, Educational Attainment o f 
Siblings in Stepfamilies, 22 Evolution & Human Behavior 269 (2001); Anne Case, I-Fen Lin, & 
Sara McLanahan, How Hungry Is the Selfish Gene? 110 Econ. J. 781 (2000); McLanahan, Sara, 
and Larry Bumpas, Intergenerational Consequences of Family Disruption. 94 Am. J. Sociol. 130 
(1988); Sara McLanahan, Family Structure and the Reproduction o f Poverty, 90 Am. J. Sociol. 
873 (1985); Cynthia C. Harper & Sara S. McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration
1 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 1999- 03, 1999), Paper Presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California (Aug. 
21-25, 1998), at http://ryder.princeton.edu/crcw/publist/workingpapers/WP99-03- Harper.pdf. 
Sara McLanahan, The Consequences o f Single Motherhood, in Sex, P reference, and  Family 
306-18 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997); Sara S. McLanahan, Single 
Mothers and Their Children, *
4Sara McLanahan, *, cited in David Myers, The American Paradox: Spiritual Hunger in 
an Age o f Plenty 85 (2000).
5Sara McLanahan, quote in Myron Magnet, The American Family, 1992, FORTUNE, 
Aug. 10, 1992, at 42, 43.
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household composition. These disruptions -  may of which are related to marital breakup -  are a 
source of continued psychological stress and may lead to climical depression in children as well 
as mothers.6 She has argued that “poverty and economic insecurity are a consequence of three 
factors: (1) the low earnings of single mothers, (2) the lack of child support from noncustodial 
fathers, and (3) the meager benefits provided by public assistance programs.”7 Yet she also has 
noted that more is involved than the reduction of material support experienced by children in 
“fragile families,” that the extent and quality of investment in children is lower in fragile families 
compared to comparable intact families, and that “broader disorganization” is evident in the 
increased rates of crime, drug abuse and underemployment.8 Her work has shown that father- 
absent, female headed households are clearly associated with economic deprivation, and family 
stress.9 She has also highlighted the risks and struggles of step-parent families.10
6McLanahan, Single Mothers and their Children, supra note__, at 11.
7McLanahan, Single Mothers and their Children, supra note__, at 11.
8McLanahan, Family Structure, supra note__, at 873.
9McLanahan, Family Structure, supra note__, at 873.
10McLanahan, Father-Absence and Youth Incarceration, supra note_
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II. How American Family Laws Generally Ignore and Are Oblivious to Fragile Families
For the most part, American Family Laws ignore and are oblivious to fragile families, per 
se. For example, I ran a computerized (Westlaw) search this summer searching for pieces 
published in American law reviews in the past two decades that included the term “fragile 
families,” and had only two dozen hits; examining those items I found that not a single article, 
essay, comment, note, book review or student casenote addressed fragile families per se.11 Not a 
single article even defined the term “fragile families.” The term was merely used incidentally in 
these articles.
This absence of focus in American law on “fragile families” is largely due to two factors. 
They are socio-economic dualism in family laws and the dichotomy between liberty and 
equality.
A. Dualism in Family Laws
Most family laws are written and developed primarily to address the needs and concerns 
of the socio-economic class who make the laws. Thus, the legal problems of the wealthy are 
quite well addressed in American family laws, and the concerns and interests of middle class 
Americans are generally represented in the legislative statutes, codes, administrative regulations 
and judicial decisions that constitute the body of contemporary family law. However, the 
concerns and legal quandries of the homeless, the impoverished, the disabled, the unpopular, the
11When I began doing research this summer to prepare this paper, I did a search on 
Westlaw, a very large computerized database, of all of the law reviews, journals, and other legal 
periodicals. I typed in the term “fragile families” and expected to find at least 50 or 60 law 
review articles on the subject. In fact, the computer search turned up only 24 “hits” - only 24 
articles, comments, notes, essays, or book reviews going back to 1987, in which the term “fragile 
families” was even used. In most, the term was used only once, and most merely referred in 
passing to fragile families in the context of discussing some specific problem that incidentally 
affected fragile families.
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marginalized, and the outcasts who are not as well represented in law-making bodies generally 
are not well-addressed in the laws or legal system.
This dichotomy is neither new nor unique to America, but it has existed in most cultures 
throughout most of recorded history. Nearly forty years ago, Jacobus ten Broek noted the same 
dualism in Elizabethan-era English family laws.12 This dichotomy was true even in and after the 
“modern,” Progressive era of welfare legislation. As Michael Grossberg argues:
[The] public law of child welfare [that] became imposed on the poor . . . brushed only 
lightly upon intact, mainstream families. These latter were governed by a private family 
law which less frequently was the object of legislation, but developed instead through 
private agreements and the decisions of courts in individual divorce cases.
In doing so, domestic relations law reinvigorated what Jacobus ten Broek has 
called the dual system of family law: liberationist policies for middle and upper classes, 
and repressive policies for the lower classes and for racial and ethnic groups.13
The first point is that there is (and historically has been) a dualism in family law that 
treats the families of the poor quite differently than it treats the families of the middle-class and
12See Jacob Ten Broek, California’s Dual System o f Family Law: Its Origin, 
Development, and Present Status, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 287, 291 (1964) (“Feudal law did not 
recognize the family as such or assign rights and duties to its members by virtue of membership. 
Property rights were the only privileges which the king's courts would enforce between father 
and son.”); *
13Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American 
Family Law, 1890-1990, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 273, 288 (1995), quoting in the first paragraph Herbert 
Jacob, Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States 129-130 
(1988), and citing after the second paragraph Jacobus Ten Broek, Family Law and the Poor: 
Essays (Joel F. Handler ed., 1971).S
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of the wealthy. Part of the problem is structural, inherit in democracy. Democratic legal systems 
generally work well to protect the rights and address the needs of the majority of the people and 
of those who hold most of the wealth and property of the society. But democracy alone is not 
structured to respond well to those on the fringes, whose needs or problems differ from those of 
the popular majority, and who control very little of the wealth, property and goods that are the 
primary interests of legal systems and which are the source of the greatest influence in all legal 
systems. Thus, addressing in law the problems of fragile families must overcome the bias 
against minorities on the margins that is inheres in the very structure of democracy.
Overcoming that structural bias against minorities is what the Bill of Rights was all about. But 
the Bill of Rights does not offer explicit protection for “fragile families,” it does not even 
mention them.
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B. The Liberty-Equality Dichotomy in Family Law
Second, the neglect in our legal system of the problems of fragile families also reflects a 
dichotomy between liberty and equality, or individualism and communitarianism, or 
libertarianism and statism,14 This dichotomy is reflected in many dimensions of our family and 
related laws. The liberty-individualist-libertarian side favors little government intervention in or 
direct influence upon families. The equality-communitarian-statist side favors massive 
government intervention, regulation, support, and shaping of families. In terms of process, the 
equality side favors use of government support programs to help fragile families, while the 
liberty side favors strengthening independent families; the statist approach favors government 
agencies as the primary delivery vehicle, while the libertarian approach favors decentralized and 
private (NGO) organizations that help individuals and couples become stronger, more 
independent families. The equality side tends to use and rely upon public law (public benefit 
law, welfare-administrative, constitutional, and criminal law); the liberty side tends to prefer 
private law (family law, contracts, private ordering). This dichotomy in American laws is
at least as old as the Constitution of the United States of America.15 Even before the 
Constitution, liberty and equality were seen as conflicting ideals.16 When Alexis de Tocqueville
14See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Liberty, Equality & the Quest for Family Justice in the 
United States in Families & Justice 208-229 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1997).
15The greatest cause of conflict at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 at which the 
Constitution of the United States was drafted, which nearly led to the dissolution of the 
Convention, was whether the states were to be given equal representation in the legislative 
branch, or whether the citizens were to be given equal representation in both houses of the 
Congress. See Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia 69-128, 185-197 (1966).
16John Locke, Second Treatise of Government in Two Treatises of Government ^4-7 , 
21-23. 95 (1970) (Cambridge Univ. Press 1960); Jules Steinberg, Locke, Rousseau and the Idea
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visted America in 1831 he found the country to be “an extraordinary phenomenon” because its 
citizens enjoyed greater equality than those in “any other country of the world, or in any age of . .
. history. . . .”17 He observed, “It is not only the fortunes of men that are equal in America; even 
their acquirements partake in some degree of the same uniformity. I do not believe that there is a 
country in the world where . . . there are so few ignorant and at the same time so few learned 
individuals.”18 However, he also noted that individual "sovereignty" (i.e., liberty) was the 
“fundamental principle” and “the grand maxim upon which civil and political society rests in the 
United States.”19
American legal scholars today generally assume that equality cannot be achieved without 
restricting some erty, and that liberty cannot flourish without producing some inequality. For 
example, in Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family,10 James Fishkin asserts that the conflict 
between liberty and equality creates a “trilemma” for modern American liberalism. That is, 
America and other liberal democracies are founded on three liberal principles: (1) equal 
opportunity (that all persons should have equal opportunity to compete for the limited goods of 
this world, and arbitrary native characteristics such as race and gender should not determine
of Consent 133-141 (1978).
17Id., vol. 1, ch. 13, at 53 (“Men [in America] are . . . seen on a greater equality in point 
of fortune and intellect, or, in other words, more equal in their strength, than in any other country 
of the world, or in any age of which history has preserved the remembrance.”). See also id., vol. 
1, Author's Introduction, at 3.
18Id., at 51-52.
19Id., vol. 1, ch. 18, at 418. “[E]very man is allowed freely to take that road which he 
thinks will lead him to heaven, just as the law permits every citizen to have the right of choosing 
his own government.” Id.
20James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family (1983).
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those opportunities -  in other words, everyone gets to line up at the same starting line of the 
race, none given a head start or handicap), (2) merit (that limited goods should be distributed on 
the basis of merit -  the gold medal goes to the first runner to cross the finish line), and (3) family 
autonomy (that the state will not coercively intervene in private families regarding internal family 
concerns such as child rearing -  the teams can train and prepare for the race however they 
choose). The “trilemma” is that even if goods (public resources, etc.) are distributed solely on 
the basis of merit, and even if the opportunity to compete on merit is open to all persons, without 
any advantage or disadvantage given on account of race or sex, all persons will not have an equal 
chance for success because of family autonomy -  because children raised in some families come 
to the starting point in the race for life's goods much better prepared to succeed than children 
raised in other families. We cannot achieve any two of these goals without violating the third.21 
Fishkin suggests that, “[i]f taken seriously, the liberal strategy of attempting to ration fairly 
opportunities for the achievement of unequal positions would require systematic intrusions into 
the family. Only then could the maintenance of background inequalities be rendered compatible 
with equal opportunities [and merit].”22
In the contest between liberty and equality, the American family law system traditionally 
has leaned toward liberty. Traditionally, there has been little regulation of the family in the
21We can preserve family autonomy and equal opportunity, but to compensate for the 
grave disparities in preparation resulting from family autonomy will have to sacrifice the 
principle of merit (award contracts on the basis or racial quotas); or we can preserve family 
autonomy and merit, but to compensate for the grave disparities in preparation resulting from 
family autonomy will have to sacrifice equal opportunity (give racial preferences in educational 
opportunity); or we can preserve equal opportunity and the principle of merit, but will have to 
sacrifice family autonomy (massive intervention to guarantee that all children are equally 
prepared to compete in life’s contests).
22Id. at 3,4.
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belief that individuals, families, and the nation flourish best and benefit most from liberty in 
family matters.13 The dominant trend of recent developments in family law in the past thirty 
years (such as the constitutional doctrine of privacy, adoption of no-fault divorce, legitimation of 
previously-prohibited sexual relations, etc.) has tended to replace old public “equality” norms (all 
married people may divorce only when set standards are violated; all people will abstain from 
sexual relations outside of marriage; cohabitation is only permitted for married couples; etc.) with 
subjective, individually-determined “liberty” standards.
The laws concern for “fragile families” has effected by this dichotomy. The historic 
preference for liberty has resulted in reluctance to intervene, to “let them alone” despite 
circumstances in which that amounts to isolation, abandonment and neglect of the suffering. On 
the other hand, the countervailing preference for equality has resulted in pressures for stultifying 
conformity to sometimes-dysfunctional or inflexibly oppressive standards, and the fostering of a 
“welfare” culture of dependency.
23See generally Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitution, Status o f Marriage, Kinship, and 
Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Much. L. Rev. 463, 479-483 
(1983) (liberty and diversity in families foster tolerance, pluralism, and liberty in political 
society).
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III. How American Family Laws Have Tried to Help or Have Benefitted Fragile Families
The principal way in which American family laws have tried to help or to benefit fragile 
families has been involved three prongs. First, they have tried to establish parentage. Second, 
they have tried to enforce child support obligations. Third, they have tried to eliminate legal 
discrimination against children born out of wedlock. Fourth, they have tried to prevent violence 
against women.
A. Parentage.
For most children born in America, parentage is not an issue because of two well- 
established presumptions -  that the woman who gives birth to a child is the mother of that child, 
and if she is married, her husband is presumed to be the father of the child. Thus, in most cases, 
there is no dispute regarding maternity because the identity of the woman who gives birth is 
usually easy to establish. (Artificial reproductive technology is increasing the number of births 
in which this is not as clear as it used to be, but in the overwhelming majority of cases the 
presumption of birth-maternity still provides a reliable basis for establishing maternity.)24
There is more problem in identifying the father of the child, and since one-third of all 
children in America are now born out of wedlock (two-thirds of some sub-groups), the 
presumption of paternity of the husband of the woman who bears the child only establishes
24For example, a child may be born to a “gestational surrogate” into whom an embryo 
resulting from in vitro fertilization of the egg of a woman desiring to have a child but whose 
medical condition does not make that possible. Calvert v. Johnson, *. Or a child may be born to 
a “donor surrogate” who donates her egg for in vitro fertilization with the sperm of a man not her 
husband and reimplantation in her womb, with the intention to deliver the child to another 
woman - the sperm donor’s wife, usually - upon birth. In re Baby M., *
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paternity for about two-thirds of the children born in the USA.25
At common law, the presumption of husband parentage was virtually irrebuttable.
Today, the strength of this presumption varies from state to state. In some states, the 
presumption of husband paternity is still very strong. For example, in Michael H. V. Gerald 
D.,26 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a California statute that totally barred an 
adulterous man from challenging the presumption that the husband of a married woman was 
“conclusively presumed” to be the legal parent of a child born to his wife, even though the 
scientific evidence clearly indicated that the neighbor, who had lived with the woman and the 
child for a time, was the biological father.27 Many states, however, allow the presumption to be 
rebutted by reliable scientific evidence of the husband’s nonpaternity (usually DNA blood-type 
evidence). For example in In re Findlay,28 the New York Court of Appeals rejected the 
application of the presumption that the offspring of a married woman is deemed to be the 
legitimate child of her husband in a case in which a woman left her husband in England, came 
with her lover to America, and had three sons by him, all of whom he acknowledged. The lower 
courts held that these boys were presumed to be the legal children of the husband 
notwithstanding the unimpeached evidence to the contrary, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
25Census Bureau, 2000 Census, at *
26491 U.S. 110 (1989).
27Cal. Evid. Code §621 allowed the mother of the child and her married husband to 
challenge the presumption of paternity, but not he adulterous, third-party biological father. 
Although the mother, a married woman, lived temporarily with several men during her marriage 
to Gerald, and even though the blood test evidence strongly supported a neighbor’s claim of 
paternity, the California courts held that the California law barred the adulterous father’s 
parentage claim, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that that did not violate the Constitution.
282 5 3 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930).
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Chief Justice Cardozo declared: “Potent, indeed, the presumption is, one of the strongest and 
most persuasive known to the law, and yet subject to the sway of reasons. . . . The presumption 
does not consecrate as the truth the extravagantly improbable. . . .”29
A brief statistical snapshot shows the relative importance of establishing legal parentage. 
In 1992 about 4, 065,000 children were born in the United States of America, of whom about
2,828,000 (69.9%) were born in wedlock.30 Parentage of all children who were born to married 
parents was established by legal presumption, cases in which the presumption is contested are 
extremely rare. In 1992, there were 264,330 paternity cases filed in 19 states, and approximately 
79,299 paternity adjudications (thus approximately 30% of the paternity claims are successful).31 
Extrapolating for all 50 states, the estimated total number of paternity cases would be 
approximately 660,000 paternity cases, and the number of successful paternity adjudications 
would be approximately 200,000. Additionally, there were approximately 51,157 adoptions 
reported in 1986, including 24,589 adoptions of newborn infants.32 Using this date, it appears
29Id. at 472-473.
30U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995 at 873 
(115th ed. 1996).
31Brian J. Ostrom, et. al., State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1992 at 26 
(1994) (statistics come from only 19 states); Hearings on the Downey-Hyde Child Support 
Enforcement and Assurance Proposal Before the Subcomm. On Human Resources o f the House 
Comm. On Ways and Means, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess., 82 (1992) (Statement of Larry D. Jackson, 
Commissioner, Virginia Dep’t. Of Social Services). In 1986 it was reported that there is a 
paternity adjunction for only 28% of all children born out of wedlock (meaning that for 
approximately 72% of illegitimate children there is no formal paternity determination). Ann 
Nichols-Casebolt & Irwin Garfinkel, Trends in Paternity Adjudications and Child Support 
Awards, 72 Soc. Sci. Q. 83-97 (1991). While some of these children have a presumed father 
because their mothers have married their fathers after birth, or the father has received the child as 
his own or done some other act to create a presumption of paternity, it seems likely that most 
illegitimate children have no known father by formal determination or by presumption.
32National Committee for Adoption, Adoption Factbook 80 (1989).
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that maternity was established by the fact of birth for virtually all of the children born, and 
paternity was established for approximately 70% of them, by legal presumption of birth and of 
being the husband of the woman who gave birth; paternity was established for approximately 5% 
of them by paternity adjudication; and parentage was established for 1% of infants by adoption.
Establishing parentage is extremely important for several reasons. First, it provides a 
potential source of financial support and responsibility for the child. With regard to children in 
“fragile families” that is somewhat dubious because a disproportionate percentage of unwed 
fathers and mothers and not financially responsible individuals. This is reviewed below.
Establishing parentage is also extremely important because it provides the opportunity 
for the development of a very profound parent-child relationship. This relationship is critical, 
almost indispensable, for the healthy emotional development of children. It also is important for 
the moral maturation of adults. While increasingly the law allows non-parents who either act 
like parents or who have functioned in loco parentis to assert the same legal rights and claims as 
true legal (legally recognized biological and adoptive) parents, the likelihood that the parent- 
child bond will actually be developed increases when parentage is clearly established.
B. Collect Child Support
Family law has been revised and strengthened to try to establish and recover child 
support for children. In intact marriages, this is rarely necessary. When the child is born out of 
wedlock or if there is a divorce or separation, it becomes very important because studies show 
that the parent (both fathers and mothers) who no longer live with their children (especially if 
they have little contact with them) are less likely to voluntarily support them adequately (if at
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The federal involvement in child support dates back to 1935 when Congress enacted the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC), which provided support to children 
in families not receiving support from an absent parent.34 “[I]n a very real sense, AFDC benefits 
were a substitute for child support.”35 In 1974, Congress required all AFDC recipients to assign 
their child support rights to the state and cooperate in the establishment and enforcement of 
support orders, and state agencies were required to establish a parent locator service using IRS 
and Social Security information. Ten years later, “Congress effectively nationalized the entire 
system of child support determination and collection with passage of the Child Support 
Enforcement Amendments of 1984. The 1984 law required states to establish objective, 
non-binding, child support ‘guidelines ,’ a state commission on child support, and a series of new 
support enforcement procedures such as mandatory wage withholding orders.”36 In 1998, 
Congress “strengthened these support laws by requiring that support guidelines be used 
presumptively to establish child support orders, setting federal standards for paternity 
establishment, extending wage withholding rules to all support orders, and creating the U.S.
all).33
33*
34Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison: An Examination o f the 
child Support Recovery Act, The Freedom o f Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and A Federal Law
Outlawing Gun Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 Harv. Women's L.J. 57,___, n.
188 (2002).
35Laura W. Morgan, The Federalization of Child Support, A Shift in the Ruling 
Paradigm: Child Support as Outside the Contours of 'Family Law,' 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial 
L. 195, 203 (1999).
36Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 541, 546-47
(1998), cited in Saylor, supra, note__, at n. 188.
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Commission on Interstate Child Support.”37
While it is clear that much more child support is being collected today than before the 
1984 and 1988 federal laws were enacted, the overall success of the Child Support Guidelines is 
somewhat debatable. The number of public child support enforcement cases (to locate parents, 
establish paternity, and establish and enforce child support) increased from 5,432,000 in 1980 to
12,796,000 in 1990, to 19,419,000 in 1998; collections were made in 2,064,000 AFDC and non- 
AFDC cases in 1990 and in 3,859,000 cases in 1998; but the percentage of AFDC cases in which 
there was collection arose less than three percentage points, from 11.0% in 1980 to 13.9% in 
1998, less than half the rate of collection in private cases (28.7% in 1980 and 28.1% in1998); 
total amounts collected rose ten-fold, from $1,478,000,000 in 1980 to 14,348,000,000 in 1998 
with collections merely quadrupling in AFDC cases, but rising 13-fold in non-AFDC cases.38 
Thus, even the increase enforcement project designed to benefit fragile families and the 
governments that support them seems to have resulted in much greater benefit to private (non- 
AFDC) families. This is not unimportant because child support is the primary method of 
support for nearly twice as many children as are on public welfare. In 1997, 4,305,000 families 
were receiving child support, while 2,682,000 families were receiving public assistance.39
C.
37Saylor, supra note__, at n. 188.
38U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001 Table 632, 
Child Support Enforcement Programs -  Caseload and Collections, 1980-1998, available at 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec12.pdf>, seen October 6, 2003.
39U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001 Table 602, 
Number of Families Receiving Specified Sources of Income available at 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec12.pdf>, seen October 6, 2003.
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Eliminate Discrimination Against Children Born Out o f Wedlock.
Today, illegitimacy has largely been abolished as an operative legal classification. It is 
neither necessary nor desirable to achieve valid child-protective or administrative management 
policies to categorize on the basis of legitimacy. Usually classification on the basis of paternity 
will achieve the same goals and purposes historically given to justify classification on the basis 
of illegitimacy. However, statutes that penalize parents for not legitimating their children 
generally are not subject to the same degree of rigorous judicial scrutiny. All states allow 
children born out of wedlock, under conditions prescribed the particular state, to be legitimated 
by the father. Legitimating a child creates the full parent-child relationship. All states have now 
enacted statutes that provide that children born into marriages that are invalid retain their status 
of legitimacy. All states provide that the child is legitimated if the child’s parents later 
intermarry and the father acknowledges the child. Some states provide a judicial process for 
legitimation.40
The history of the abolition of illegitimacy goes back to 1968 when the Supreme Court 
decided Levy v. Louisiana,41 and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co..42 Both 
cases involved a Louisiana wrongful death statute which provided that wrongful death actions 
could be brought by children for the death of their parents, and by parents for the death of their
40See generally, Lynn D. Wardle & Laurence C. Nolan, Fundamental Principles of 
Family Law (Ch. 10), at 264-273 (2002) (from which this discussion is taken). See also Laurence
C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme Court from  
Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1
(1999).
41391 U.S. 68 (1968).
42 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
-19-
children. However, the statute did not include illegitimate children within the definition of 
"children." In Levy, five illegitimate children sought to recover for the wrongful death of their 
mother, and in Glona, the mother of an illegitimate child sought to recover for the wrongful 
death of her child. In both cases, Louisiana courts upheld the statute and denied recovery. The 
Supreme Court reversed in both cases. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the majority. He 
began by emphasizing the personhood of illegitimate children: "We start from the premise that 
illegitimate children are not single 'nonpersons.' They are humans, live, and have their being. 
They are clearly single 'persons' within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment."43 Applying a rational relation test, he concluded that "it is invidious to 
discriminate against [illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is 
possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother."44 Denying wrongful death recovery to 
mothers of illegitimate children was equally irrational because it would be "far fetched to assume 
that women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages for their 
death.45 Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Black and Justice Stewart, dissented arguing that all 
wrongful death statutes are unavoidably arbitrary: an adulterous wife can recover for the death of 
her husband, a nonsupportive child can recover for the death of his parents, a loving couple who 
has raised an unadopted child cannot recover for the death of that child. A biological 
relationship was deemed to be no more rational than the legal relationship of legitimacy.46
Three years later the Supreme Court reached an apparently inconsistent conclusion in
43391 U.S. at 70.
44Id. at 71.
45Id.
46Id. at 80.
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Labine v. Vincent47 That case involved a Louisiana law which provided that legitimate children 
could inherit from their parents, naturalized or acknowledged children could only inherit under a 
will, but under testate succession, and illegitimate children could not inherit by will or in testate 
succession. A child who had been born out of wedlock, but acknowledged before a notary by 
her parents, petitioned to be appointed administrator of the estate of her father who had died in 
testate and had been declared his only heir. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion upholding 
the law. He emphasized federalism: "The power to make rules to establish, protect, and 
strengthen family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man 
dying there is committed by the Constitution of United States and the people of Louisiana to the 
legislature of that state."48 While discrimination against illegitimates seemed unfair, the statute 
also discriminated against concubines as opposed to wives and collateral relations as opposed to 
ascending and descending relations. The task of drawing arbitrary lines, the Court concluded, 
was best left to the states. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall, 
dissented; they would not "uphold the untenable and discredited moral prejudice of bygone 
centuries which vindictively punished not only the illegitimate's parents, but also the helpless 
and innocent children."49
A year later, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty Insurance Co.,50 the Court distinguished 
Labine. Weber involved a Louisiana Worker's Compensation scheme which gave preference in 
recovery of worker's compensation benefits to legitimate and statutorial acknowledged
47401 U.S. 532 (1971).
48Id. at 538.
49Id. at 541.
50406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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illegitimate children. Unacknowledged children were entitled to recover only to the extent that 
the claims of the preferred claimants did not exhaust the fund. Louisiana law did not permit a 
married man to acknowledge his children born to another woman. The decedent in Weber was 
married, but was not living with his wife (who was committed to a mental hospital.) Living in 
his home were his four legitimate children and one unacknowledged illegitimate child of the 
woman he was living with (who bore another illegitimate child posthumously). When the man 
died in an industrial accident, the unacknowledged children received nothing because the four 
legitimate children exhausted the worker's compensation benefits. On appeal, the Supremem 
Court held the Louisiana statute unconstitutional. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
distinguished Labine because in that case the deceased father could have simply insured that his 
illegitimate children would receive some of his estate by making a will or marrying their mother. 
In this case, the deceased could neither marry the mother of the illegitimate children nor legally 
acknowledge them under the Louisiana statute. He further declared:
"The status of illegitimacy as expressed through the ages society's condemnation 
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation 
on the head of the infant is illogical and unjust period. Moreover, imposing disability on 
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system. The legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual -­
as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the parent."51 
Justice Rehnquist dissented emphasizing federalism, i.e., that the Supreme Court should not 
scrutinize too rigorously state legislation dealing with such matters as recover of the death of
51 Id. at 175.
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injured workers, intestate succession, etc.52
Gomez v. Perez,53 involved a Texas law extending the right of paternal support to 
legitimate children but denied the right to paternal support to illegitimate children. In a Per 
Curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that discrimination violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against 
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded to children generally.”54
In Parham v. Hughes,55 the Court upheld a Georgia statute that denied the father of an 
illegitimate child a wrongful death claim. Justice Stewart authored a plurality opinion for 
himself, Chief Justice Burger, Rehnquist, and Stevens. The Georgia statute did not discriminate 
against illegitimate children, but penalized fathers who refused to legitimate their offspring. The 
difference in statutory treatment between unwed mothers and unwed fathers was justified by the 
difference in their circumstances: unwed mothers are easily identifiable, but there is always a 
question of proof to establish the paternity of an illegitimate child. Glona was distinguished 
because the Louisiana statute in that case excluded every mother of an illegitimate child, while 
the Georgia statute excludes only fathers who have not legitimated their children born out of 
wedlock. The fathers could legitimate unilaterally. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment 
emphasizing that the gender distinction was justifiable because of the difference in proof of 
paternity and maternity. Justice White with Brennan, Marshall, and Blackman dissented because 
the statute went further than necessary to achieve the purpose of avoiding problems of proof; in
52Id. at 184.
53409 U.S. 535 (1973) .
54Id. at 538.
55421 U.S. 347 (1979).
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the case at bar, paternity was undisputed. The presumption that the father of a child born out of 
wedlock will not suffer any loss by the child’s death was too sweeping.
The latest two cases were heard in 1998 and in 2001, where the Supreme Court upheld on 
a strong deference-to-Congress grounds an immigration law that made illegitimate children born 
to U.S. mothers abroad citizens upon birth, but required illegitimate children born to U.S. fathers 
to apply for citizenship before majority.56
D. Prevent and Punish Domestic Violence
One of the two things that all legal systems are capable of doing best is to prevent and 
punish physical violence.57 Because of increasing awareness of the scope and severity of the 
problem, laws focusing on preventing and punishing domestic violence have greatly increased in 
the past twenty years. All states prohibit and punish domestic violence with criminal laws,58 
most states have attempted to disarm domestic violence abusers,59 all states provide simple 
proceedings for victims of domestic violence to obtain civil protection (protective orders),60 and 
all states also take domestic violence into account in various civil proceedings (such as child
56See Miller v. Albright,__U .S.__ (1998); Nguyen and Boulais v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,__U .S.__ (2001).
57The other is to enforce financial obligations.
58Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect -  Their 
Legal Framework, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 77, 106-07 (1998).
59Alison J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection o f Domestic Violence and Guns: The Public 
Interest Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 822, 833 (2002).
60Christine O'Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights o f 
Victims, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 937,___(1999).
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custody determinations).61
The term “domestic violence” is commonly used in the United States to refer to 
“violence occurring in relationships between current or former partners.”62 Domestic violence 
involves a continuum of behaviors ranging from degrading remarks to economic exploitation, 
from beating to sexual abuse, from threats to homicide.63 There is no standard definition of 
domestic violence in American law.64 Each state has its own “domestic violence” law 
(sometimes several different statutes, with different definitions), and additionally there are 
several federal statutes defining and punishing “domestic violence.”65 Thus, domestic violence
61Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic 
Violence, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 593, 699 n. 595 (2000).
62Jenny Rivera, Preliminary Report: Availability o f Domestic Violence Services for  
Latina Survivors in New York State, 16 Buffalo Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 2 n.3 (1997-98), cited in Brooks 
Holland ,Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New York: The Door 
Opens Wide, 8 Cardozo Women's L.J. 171, 171 (2002).
63Laurel Wheeler, Comments, Mandatory Family Mediation and Domestic Violence, 26 
S. Ill. U. L.J. 559, 561 (2002), citing Barbara J. Hart, Domestic Violence Overview, in Manual 
for the 1st Judicial Circuit Family Violence Symposia § 1 (1998).
64 Sharon G. Portwood, John Q. La Fond & Kelly E. Kinnison, Social Science 
Contributions to the Study o f Domestic Violencw Within the Law School Curriculum, 47 Loy. L. 
Rev. 137, 148 (2001) (“no universally accepted characterization of ‘domestic violence’ exists.”).
65The most widely-known federal statute is the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 
which incorporated the states’ definitions of violence for its civil action provision, 42 U.S.C. § 
13981(d)(2)(A) (1994). VAWA’s ,main criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, prohibits 
“interstate domestic violence” defined as “travel[ing] across a State line . . . with the intent to 
injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course of or 
as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence.” Section 2262 prohibits 
interstate travel with the intent to violate a protective order. For purpose of the federal Gun 
Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2001), Congress defined domestic violence as 
violence “committed by a current or former spouse ... of the victim, by a person who is 
cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse ... or by a person similarly 
situated to a spouse ... of the victim.” This Act prohibits gun possession by domestic violence 
abusers, prohibits anyone subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a gun 
in or affecting commerce, Id. § 922(g)(1)-(9) (2001), and also makes it unlawful for “any person
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has many definitions.66 For example, in Utah, the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act defines 
“domestic violence” as “any criminal offense involving violence or physical harm or threat of 
violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a criminal 
offense involving violence or physical harm, when committed by one cohabitant against 
another.”67 This law lists 16 separate offenses which if committed by one cohabitant against 
another constitutes “domestic violence.”68
... who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a gun in or 
affecting commerce. Id. § 922(g)(8). A misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is defined as 
any misdemeanor that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the 
threatened use of a deadly weapon” if the victim is the current or former spouse, domestic 
partner, parent, or guardian of the perpetrator.” Id.§ 921 (a) (33) (A).
66 “‘Domestic violence,’ of course, can entail many definitions, not all of which may be 
viewed as accurate.” Holland, supra note 1, at 171 (“While there are many working definitions, 
no universally accepted characterization of ‘domestic violence’ exists.”).
67Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1 (2002).
68Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1 (2002): “‘Domestic violence’ also means commission 
or attempt to commit, any of the following offenses by one cohabitant against another:
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103;
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102;
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201;
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106;
(e) telephone harassment, as described in Section 76-9-201;
(f) kidnaping, child kidnaping, or aggravated kidnaping, as described in Sections 76-5-301, 
76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302;
(g) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105;
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Title 76, Chapter 5a;
(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5;
(j) unlawful detention, as described in Section 76-5-304;
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as described in Section 
76-5-108;
(l) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, 2, or 3;
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as described in Section 76-10-507;
(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the direction of any person, 
building, or vehicle, as described in Section 76-10-508;
(o) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction of disorderly conduct 
is the result of a plea agreement in which the defendant was originally charged with any of the
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While all agree that domestic violence is a serious problem in the United States, 
estimates of the incidence and frequency of domestic violence vary widely, depending on how 
domestic violence is defined and who is making the estimate. Estimates of the number of 
American couples who experience some form of domestic violence each year vary from 1.5 
million to 8.7 million.69 One of the better sources, The National Institutes of Justice, recently 
reported that 1.5% of women and .9 % of men were physically assaulted (including rapes) in the 
last 12 months by an intimate partner, and over their lifetime, approximately 25 % of all women 
and 7.6 % of all men report being assaulted by a current or former spouse, cohabiting partner or 
date.70 Between 1992 and 1996, nearly one million incidents involving non-lethal physical 
violence were reported as occurring every year.71 “The percentage of female murder victims
domestic violence offenses otherwise described in this Subsection (2). Conviction of disorderly 
conduct as a domestic violence offense, in the manner described in this Subsection (2)(o), does 
not constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 921, and is 
exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms Act, 18 U.S.C.Section 921 et seq.; or 
(p) child abuse as described in Section 76-5-109.1.
“Cohabitant” includes any emancipated person 16 years old or older who is or was the spouse, 
live-in partner, resided at the same residence as, relative of, parent-in-common with, or the 
victim. Id. § 77-36-1 (1), citing Utah Code Annotated § 30-6-1(2) (2002).
69 Compare Murray A. Strauss & Richard J. Gelles, How violent are American families? 
Estimates from the national family violence survey and other studies, in Physical Violence in 
American Families: Risk Factors and Adaptations to Violence in 8,145 Families, 95-112 (M. A. 
Strauss & R.J. Gelles, eds. 1990) (estimating that 8.7 million couples experiencephysical 
aggression each year, and 3.4 million experience severe violence carrying high risk of injury) 
with Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, E x ten t, N atu re , and  Consequences of Intim ate 
P a r tn e r  Violence: Findings From th e  N a tio n a l V iolence A gainst Women Survey, Nat. 
Inst. of Justice, 2002, at iii, <http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf> (estimating that 1.5 
million women and 834,732 men are physically assaulted (including rapes) each year by an 
intimate partner).
70Tjaden & Thoennes, supra, at iii.
71Lawrence A. Greenfield, et al., Violence by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes by 
Current or Former Spouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends, Bureau of Justice Statistics Factbook 
(NCJ-167237) (U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Mar., 1998) cited in Portwood, La Fond & Kennison,
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killed by intimate partners has remained at about 30% since 1976.”72 Women and children in 
“fragile families” are at greater risk of being victims of domestic violence or child abuse than 
children in intact families.
IV. How American Family Laws Have Harmed or Had Detrimental Impact Upon Fragile 
Families
[In this section I will review how American family laws have been slow to respond to the 
plight o f fragile families, and have often provided inadequate and misguided “legal” 
solutions.”]
V. How Strengthening the Culture o f Marriage in Society and Marital Skills o f Struggling 
Couples Helps Fragile Families
Government efforts to strengthen marriage are growing. For example, three states have 
enacted “covenant marriage” laws which require a stronger public commitment to marriage, 
require pre-marital counseling, require counseling to revive the marriage before divorce, and 
provide stricter grounds for divorce (essentially fault or one- or two-year separation).73
By 2001, at least eighteen states reportedly had enacted laws or established programs
supra, note 6, at 147.
72Calle Marie Rennison & Sarah Welchans U.S. Dep’t Justice, Intimate Partner Violence
1 (2000), cited in Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandry, 90 Ky. L.J. 123, 127 (2001-02).
73See generally Alan J. Hawkins, Reflections on Covenant Marriage, The Family in 
America, Nov. 1998, at 1-8.
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designed to strengthen marriage.74 These include marital skills training programs, commissions 
to investigate how to support marriage, publicity to promote marriage, providing financial 
incentives to welfare recipients who marry, public marriage education programs, marriage 
license fee reduction for parties who have had premarital counseling, and setting state goals to 
reduce the rate of divorce.75 Florida was one of the first when in 1998 the legislature passed a 
“Marriage Preservation and Preparation Act” requiring all high school students in the state to be 
given instruction in “marriage and relationship skills education,” offering a reduction in the price 
of marriage licenses and waiver of the three-day waiting perioid to couples who undergo at least 
four hours of training in a “premarital preparation course,” and requiring couples who file for 
divorce to attend a “Parent Education and Family Stabilization Course” addressing the legal and 
emotional impact of divorce on adults and children, financial responsibility, laws on child abuse 
or neglect and conflict resolution skills.76
Supporting and strengthening marriage is one of the hallmarks of President Bush’s 
welfare reform marriage initiatives. For example, in a recent Presidential Proclamation (October 
3, 2003) establishing marriage Protection Week, President Bush’s declared that protection of
74Cheryl Wetzstein, Welfare Promotes Marriage, Wash. Times, Septe. 16, 2001, 
available at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20020916-9551968.htm> (viewed 
September 17, 2001) (copy in author’s possession).
75Id. See also Fagan, supra note__at 3, 8-11.
76Florida Stats. Ann. §§ 741.0305 (fee reduction); 741.04 (waiver of waiting period); 
61.21 (parent education course); see generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant 
Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 La. L. Rev. 64, 129-130 (1998) (citing 
Marriage Preparation and Preservation Act, ch. 98-403 (Fla. H.B. No. 1019) (2d Reg. Sess.
1998) (eff. Jan. 1, 1999) and noting that “another provision of the same legislation requires that a 
course in life management skills (1/2 credit), which would include among the other components 
marriage and relationship skill-based education, be taught to high school students as a graduation 
requirement,” citing Fla. Stat. ch. 232.6 (eff. Jan. 1, 1999).); see further Wardle, supra note__.
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marriage “is essential to the continued strength of our society,” and that his administration is 
committed to “working to support the institution of marriage byhelping couples build successful 
marriages and be good parents.”77
The Administration for Children and Families in the Department of Health and Human 
Services reports that the House welfare reauthorization bill (HR 4) includes funding for healthy 
marriage education and research totally over $200 million including matching grants for high 
school education on the value of marriage and relationship skills, marriage education skill 
development programs (including conflict resolution), pre-marital education for engaged 
couples, marriage enhancement programs, divorce reduction, marriage mentoring, etc..78 The 
government policy to strengthen marriages is based on abundant research that shows that 
married couples acquire more wealth, reducing the chance that children will be raised in poverty, 
children raised in intact two-parent married households enjoy better physical health than children 
raised in other households, and marriage reduces the risk of domestic violence in the home.79 
The goal is “to help couples, who choose marriage for themselves, develop the skills and 
knowledge to form and sustain healthy marriages”80
77Marriage Protection Week, 2003, By the President of the United States, A 
Proclamation, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031003-
12.html> (seen Oct. 7, 2003).
78U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Administration for Children and 
Families, Healthy Marriage Matters to ACF, available at
<http://faq.acf.hhs.gov/cgi-bin/rightnow.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_admin=1&p_faqid=703 
&p_created=1045142599>, (seen Oct. 6, 2003) (herein “Healthy Marriage”).
79Healthy Marriage, supra note __ .
80U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Administration for Children and 
Families, Strengthening Healthy Marriages: A Compendium o f Approaches, at 2 available at 
<http://faq.acf.hhs.gov/cgi-bin/rightnow.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_admin=1&p_faqid=703 
&p_created=1045142599> (draft August 2002), (seen Oct. 6, 2003) (herein “Strengthening
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Some feminists object because they think it encourages women to become dependent 
upon men.81 Some critics object that the fathers of single mothers’ children often are poor 
providers, and abusive, and that pushing marriage may push some women into abusive, 
impoverished relationships.82 Others charge that the marriage initiative promotes a stereotype of 
weak, male-dependent women who are defective because they are not married.83 Some critics 
think it is the government trying to legislate and enforce religious morality.84 Others object that 
it is getting government involved in the private affairs of its citizens.85
Supporters emphasize that the marriage initiative in welfare program is not coercive, and 
it is not a dating or marriage service; rather it provides an opportunity to those interested to take
Compendium’”).
81Sarah Stewart Taylor, Heated Debate on Welfare May Focus on Marriage, Women’s 
eNews, <http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/467/context/archive> (seen Oct. 7, 
2003). “It’s a patriarchal sexist mentality to say that the cure for a poor mother's poverty is a 
father's income," says Gwendolyn Mink, a professor of political science at the University of 
California at Santa Cruz and author of a 1998 book on welfare reform, ‘Welfare's End.’ . . . ‘It’s 
making women dependent on men instead of doing other things that help women support their 
families.’” Id. “‘The ideological underpinning of this is that to allow women to raise children on 
their own is a real threat to the patriarchy,’ says Abramovitz.” Id.
82 “Women often have excellent reasons for not wanting to marry their former or current 
sex partners: The partners may not be particularly good wage earners and many may be abusive, 
violent or otherwise unfit parents.” Id.
83“‘Rather than address the problem, the government is reverting to trying to enforce a 
stereotype on women,’” she said. Id.
84“Some women say that's exactly what it is. ‘This is a coercive act by the government,’ 
says Mink. She adds that laws that promote heterosexual marriage discriminate against poor 
lesbian and gay parents.” Id.
85* See also Marriage as Public Policy, available at 
<http://www.arches.uga.edu/~bbethany/> (Seen Oct. 7, 2003).
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advantage of it. They point to an extensive survey of 2323 Oklahoma residents (including 300 
Medicaid recipients) in 2002 that revealed that eighty-five percent of the population supported 
the government’s effort to promote marriage and reduce divorce was “very good” or “good”, and 
nearly three-fourths (72 percent) of the welfare recipients surveyed said they would consider 
going to relationship-education classes (six percent higher than the general population).86 
Supporters of the marriage initiative in welfare reform reject the claim that marriage is none of 
the business of government. “As Governor Keating of Oklahoma has said, ‘[W]hen you look at 
the consequences of divorce, the better question is: ‘What business do we have not getting 
involved?’ Good government has a critical interest in stable marriages.”87
Patrick Fagan, a defender of the government’s marriage initiative in welfare reform,
writes:
Although America has invested $8.4 trillion in social programs since the War on 
Poverty began in the 1960s, welfare dependency, juvenile crime, child abuse, school 
underachievement, drug abuse, suicide among children, and many other problems have 
increased. At the same time, federal and state governments still spend about $150 billion 
each year subsidizing single-parent families. This stands in stark contrast to the 
approximately $150 million they spend each year in an effort to reduce out-of-wedlock 
births and divorce--the two principal causes of single-parent families in America.
86Cheryl Wetzstein, Pro-marriage initiatives win enthusiastic survey support, The 
Washington Times, July 12, 2002, available at
<http://asp.washtimes.com/printarticle.asp?action=print&ArticleID=20020712-15065270> (seen 
October 7, 2003). Oklahoma Governor Keating had turned over up to $10 million in surplus 
state welfare funds to marrige-strengthening programs after learning that the sluggish economy 
and marital instability were connected.
87Fagan, infra note __ , at __ .
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In other words, for every $1,000 that government spends providing services to 
broken families, it spends $1 trying to stop family breakdown. All society receives in 
return for this lopsided "investment" is more of what it subsidizes--broken families, 
troubled children, and social problems.
Rather than throwing more funds at government programs that deal with the 
effects of family breakdown, federal and state officials should take steps to prevent 
family disintegration in the first place.88 
He supports the marriage initiatve because:
Social science literature is replete with robust findings on the harmful effects of broken 
families, particularly for children. Juvenile crime, abuse and violence, and lowered 
income are often associated in the research with single-parent families . . . . Children 
born out of wedlock have an increased risk of death in infancy, higher incidence of 
retarded cognitive and verbal development, and higher rates of drug addiction and 
out-of-wedlock pregnancy as teens. As adults, they have higher rates of divorce, work at 
lower-wage jobs, and abuse their children more often.
Policymakers who hope to stop this societal fall must look instead at ways to reduce 
divorce and out-of-wedlock birth by strengthening marriage.89
88Patrick F. Fagan, Encouraging Marriage and Discouraging Divorce, The Heritage 
Foundation, Policy Research & Analysis (March 26, 2001), available at 
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/BG1421.cfm> (Seen Oct. 7, 2003).
89Id. at .
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***
There is some early indication that the marriage initiatives (both private and government) 
may be having some positive effect on reducing single-parent childrearing.
The analysis of the National Survey of America’s Families (a survey of 40,000 nationally 
representative families) done by Urban Institute scholars Gregory Acs and Sandi Nelson [found]: 
Between 1997 and 2002, the proportion of children under 6 living in intact married families 
actually increased. So did the proportion of all children in low-income households (the bottom 
quater) by close to 4 percent.
The less good news is that part of the shift away from single mothers was into cohabiting 
rather than married families. A study by Sara McLanahan and colleagues . . . suggests “children 
born to cohabiting mothers are reportedly more aggressive, more withdrawn, more 
anxious/depressive, and have more overall behavior problems at age 3 than children born to 
married parents.” . . .90
There is additional evidence that strengthening marriage reduces the problems that afflice 
“fragile families.” For instance, one way to prevent or reduce the incidence of domestic violence 
is to strengthen marriage skills. It is clear that couples who have learned the skills of conflict 
resolution are less likely to experience domestic violence and divorce than couples who have not 
developed those skills. The skills of conflict resolution and successfully living in marriage can be 
learned. Thus, marriage preparation programs, marriage education, and marital skill training
90Maggie Gallagher, Good News About Marriage, Townhall.com 
<http://www.townhall.com/columnists/maggiegallagher/mg20030910.shtml> (seen Sept. 11, 
2003).
-34-
programs appear to reduce domestic violence in vulnerable couples.
Scott Stanley, one of the leading researchers into marriage skill development attests: 
“There is some evidence of a primary preventative effect of PREP [Prevention and Relationship 
Enhancement Program - a marital skill development program] in lowering the likelihood of 
relationship aggression.”91 Likewise, another leading study in the field of marriage counseling and 
education reports that persons who participated in a preventative intervention program for 
couples planning marriage reported significantly lower instances of physical violence than 
couples who did not participate in any prevention program.92 Because couples who have 
experienced violence during their pre-marital relations are at greatest risk of experiencing
93domestic violence during marriage, teaching marriage preparation skills to such couples, in 
particular, may have a positive effect to reduce the risk and rate of domestic violence.94 
“[R]eviewers of the literature agree that marital therapy is effective, at least in the short term, in 
reducing marital conflict. In addition, . . . analysis of the efficacy of marital therapy for 
promoting martial stability indicates some long-term positive effects for reducing marital 
conflict and preventing divorce.”95 Marital and family therapy is reported to be “more
91Scott M. Stanley, Making a Case for Premarital Education, 50 FAMILY RELATIONS 272, 
277 (2001).
92Howard Markman, et al. , Preventing Marital Distress Through Communication and 
Conflict Management Training: A  4- and 5-Year Follow Up, 61 JOURNAL OF CONSULTING AND 
C l in ic a l  Ps y c h o l o g y , 70, 74-75 (1993).
93Amy Holtsworth-Munroe, Howard Markman, et al., The need for marital violence 
prevention efforts -  A behavioral-cognitive secondary prevention program for engaged and 
newly married couples, 4 Applied & P re v e n ta tiv e  P sy ch o lo g y  77 (Spring, 1995).
94Id.
95James H. Bray & Ernest N. Jouriles, Treatment of Marital Conflict and Prevention of 
Divorce, 21 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY 461, 470 (1995).
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efficacious than standard and/or individual treatments” in overcoming some problems that may 
trigger domestic violence, including depressed outpatient women in distressed marriages, marital 
distress in general, alcoholism, and drug abuse.96
For example, the 4- and 5-year follow-up of couples trained in one marriage skill 
development program (Prevention and Relationship Enhancement Program, or PREP) revealed 
that couples who had received the training reported about one-fourth the level of physical 
violence than did comparable (control) couples who had not received the skills training.97 
Another study of the same marital skills program (PREP) showed that couples who had gone 
through the marital skills training studied three years later “showed a decrease in problem 
intensity over time, whereas control couples showed an increase.”98 Likewise, the control 
(untrained) couples “evidenced declines in levels of relationship quality, whereas [marital skills- 
trained] couples maintained or improved their already high level of functioning.”99 A study of 
couples with an alcoholic partner who received a behavioral marital therapy (BMT) program 
reported:
The prevalence of husband-to-wife violence was significantly decreased in both
the first year and the second year after the [therapy], as compared to the year
96William M. Pinsof & Lyman C. Wynne, 21 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 
T h era py  585 (1995).
97Howard J. Markman, Mari Jo Renick, Frank J. Floyd, Scott M. Stanley & Mari 
Clements, Preventing Marital Distress Through Communications and Conflict Management 
Training: A 4- and 5-Year Follow-Up, 61 J. Consult. & Clin. Psych. 70, 74-75 (1993) (.39 
compared to 1.53 mean yearly physical violence reported by couples with marital skills training 
and contol group).
98.Howard J. Markman, Frank J. Floyd, Scott M. Stanley & Rangar D. Storaasli, Preventioni o f 
Marital Distress: A Longitudinal Investigation, 56 J. Consult. & Clin. Psych. 210, 215 (1988).
99Id. at 214.
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before [therapy]. The percentage of couples who experienced any violent act 
decreased from 61.3% in the year before BMT to 22.7% in the first year after 
BMT . . . and to 18.7% in the second year after BMT . . . . The percentage 
experience severe violence decreased from 24.0% in the year before BMT to
6.6% in the first year after BMT . . . and to 8.0% in the second year after BMT . . .
100
Likewise, “[c]omparisons of verbal aggression in the first and second year after BMT for 
the alcoholic husbands showed that both the frequency of verbal aggression and the prevalance 
of clinically elevated verbal aggression declined significant . . . ”101 Other studies suggest that 
“prevention programs may be useful, because early intervention may help prevent the 
continuation and escalation of physical aggression.”102 More than 100 studies “show that a wide 
variety of marriage-strengthening programs can reduce strife, improve communication, incrase 
parenting skills, increase stability, and enhance mari-2.3kAplinssn.”
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involve similar skills that can be learned and applied effectively within the mutual support 
system that we call marriage, these data provide some hope for fragile families who can and are 
able to marry.
Finally, the general public appears to support social efforts to strengthen marriage.104 
Public opinion surveys consistently report that Americans believe that divorce is too easy. For 
example, Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard Survey Project American Values: 1998 National 
Survey of Americans on Values asked whether divorce should be easier, harder or same as it is; 
respondents saying that divorce should be harder outnumbered those thinking it should be easier 
nearly three-to-one, and outnumbered those thinking it should be the same or easier nearly two- 
to-one -- the highest percentage to say they thought divorce is too easy since the pollsters began 
charting responses to that question 30 years earlier, in 1968.105 The same survey also reported 
that 50% of those surveyed believe that divorce is “not acceptable” when the couple has children 
(compared to 46% who believe that divorce is acceptable then).106 While seventy-six percent of 
those polled agree in principle that divorce is acceptable at least sometimes, eighty percent of the 
respondents indicated that it was not acceptable at least sometimes.107 A Time/CNN survey May 
7-8, 1999, by Yankelovich Partners Inc also reported that fifty percent of those surveyed agreed 
that “it should be harder than it is not for married couples to get a divorce,” while 61% agreed
104See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn o f the Millenium: 
Certainties and Possibilities, 33 Fam. L. Q. 783 (1999).
105See, e.g., Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard Survey Project American Values: 1998 
National Survey of Americans on Values at p. 7, Q12 (asked whether divorce should be easier, 
harder or same as it is response was: Easier 22, Harder 62, Same 11). 
<http://www.kff.org/archive/media/projects/values/values.pdf> (searched Aug 3, 1999).
106Id. at p.7, Q11.
107Id. at p. 4, Question 7.
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that it should “be harder than it now is for couples with young children to get a divorce,” and 
64% agreed that people “should be required to take a marriage-education course before they can 
get a marriage license.”108 Thus, there is “widespread dissatisfaction with the current social and 
legal landscape of marriage and divorce . . . .”109
108Time/CNN Poll: Divorce, <http://patriot.net/~crouch/wash/timetable.htm> (searched 
July 31, 1999).
109Elizabeth Scott and Robert E. Scott, Marriage As A Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. 
Rev. 1225, 1226 (1998).
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VI. Conclusion
From ancient times, care for the widows and the fatherless has been a primary standard of 
individual and social morality.110 The existence in significant numbers of “fragile families” is an 
indication of some failure in American laws and social policies, including American family laws.
Many thoughtful critics have argued that America has gone too far in pursuit of liberty 
(radical individualism) at the expense of equality (community).111 The truth is that the 
American legal system is a hybrid system, that it balances both equality interests and liberty 
interests.
There is a need for the traditional public-poverty-law approach to provide support for 
“fragile families.” There also is a need for the traditional private (quasi-public) child support 
order and enforcement programs to provide for the economic needs of “fragile families.” There 
clearly is a need to improve such legal claims, mechanisms and procedures.
However, there is more to the solution than just tried-and-failed traditional “legal”
110Deuteronomy 24:20-21 (KJV)
20 When thou beatest thine olive tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again: it shall be for the 
stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow.
21 When thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean [it] afterward: it shall be 
for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow.
Psalms 82:3 (KJV)
3 Defend the poor and fatherless: do justice to the afflicted and needy.
Malachi 3:5 (KJV)
5 And I will come near to you to judgment; and I will be a swift witness against the sorcerers, 
and against the adulterers, and against false swearers, and against those that oppress the hireling 
in [his] wages, the widow, and the fatherless, and that turn aside the stranger [from his right], and 
fear not me, saith the LORD of hosts.
111See generally, Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western law passim 
(1987); Symposium: Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal System: 
Tensions and Accommodations 1993 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 385-742.
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procedures. The old axiom that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” may provide 
wise guidances in considering how to address the problems of “fragile families.” By helping 
vulnerable individuals and couples to better prepare for marriage, by providing accessible 
programs to help them develop marital skills, by providing access for those in trouble marriages to 
those who can teach skills of marital healing, communication, conflict avoidance and conflict 
resolution, by encouraging couples to find ways to resolve their difficulties without violence, 
without abuse, and without abandonment, the continual creation of “fragile families” may be 
reduced. By teaching the importance and benefits of marriage, by putting high social value upon 
undertaking, accepting and fulfilling marital responsibilities fewer “fragile families” may be 
created. By recreating a “marriage culture” in America, fewer vulnerable young individuals, 
couples and their children may be trapped in the quagmire of “fragile families.” There should be 
a balanced, hybrid approach in public policy to responding to the crisis of “fragile families” in 
America.
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